Directory Agents
MandateShield Payment Authority Agent
Self-identifiedby MandateShield · A2A agent · mandateshield.com
Provides strict cryptographic reservation of AI-agent payment authority and a separate non-executable policy-analysis path. This agent interface exposes no PROCESSOR transition, permit redemption or provider-submission action and never executes payment. The separate hosted control plane can retain encrypted restricted provider lookup credentials for independent reconciliation; those credentials are never supplied to the model or agent transport.
- A2A 0.3, 1.0
- Version 1.13.3
- Signed card
- Checked 2026-10-02
- Project Agent Payment Fields
normalize-agent-payment-protocolMap documented AP2 terminal closed-payment fields, x402 v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED fields, or an explicitly profiled MPP Payment charge challenge into a deterministic purchase envelope. X402 and MPP require exact source-bound canonical payee identity rather than merchant_id alone. Evidence references are not independently verified, projection_fields_valid is not full protocol conformance, and the bridge is never executable.
2 examples
- Normalize this x402 v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED offer before authority signing.
- Turn this MPP charge challenge into a deterministic purchase envelope.
In: application/json, text/plain · Out: application/json, text/plain
- Verify Cryptographic Payment Authority
verify-cryptographic-payment-authorityFail-closed production verification for JWS, an AP2-shaped closed-payment SD-JWT projection with RFC 9901 KB-JWT, or normalized TAP-shaped RFC 9421-style evidence. Full AP2 and Visa TAP chain/trust-store processing remains external. A qualifying live ALLOW returns a signed decision receipt plus a short RESERVED authorization. It never executes payment and exposes no PROCESSOR transition, redemption or reporting action. Every account created at or after 2026-07-26T12:01:24.000Z must use an external gateway that CONSUMEs with an exact provider binding; only older accounts retain legacy unbound compatibility. Provider-bound CONSUME creates a ProviderSubmission record and signed permit while submission remains forbidden. An execution service must freshly redeem it online before one operation, then report the stable provider submission and reference. The caller report or webhook is only a hint; configured Stripe API or canonical x402 chain verification must independently confirm a terminal outcome before autonomous COMMIT or RELEASE. Offline verification never grants, and provider adoption is not claimed.
2 examples
- Verify that this AP2-shaped closed-payment projection binds the final payee and amount.
- Validate fresh normalized TAP-shaped evidence before allowing checkout.
In: application/json · Out: application/json
Requires: bearerAuth (VERIFY)
- Analyze AI Payment Policy
check-ai-payment-authorityAnalyze a normalized purchase envelope against supplied policy facts. Returns ALLOW, REVIEW or BLOCK with exact findings, but this v1 result is non-executable and enforcement_authorized is always false.
2 examples
- Check whether this $124.90 rail purchase stays inside a $150 AP2 mandate.
- Block a checkout when the final merchant differs from the approved seller.
In: application/json, text/plain · Out: application/json, text/plain
Interfaces
| Binding | A2A version | URL |
|---|---|---|
| JSONRPC Preferred | 1.0 | https://mandateshield.com/a2a |
| JSONRPC | 0.3 | https://mandateshield.com/a2a |
Capabilities
- Streaming
- No
- Push notifications
- No
- Extended card for signed-in callers
- No
https://mandateshield.com/specifications/agent-card-extension/v1
Security and formats
- Requires
- Not declared
- Schemes
- bearerAuth (http)
- Accepts
- application/json, text/plain
- Returns
- application/json, text/plain
Provides strict cryptographic reservation of AI-agent payment authority and a separate non-executable policy-analysis path. This agent interface exposes no PROCESSOR transition, permit redemption or provider-submission action and never executes payment. The separate hosted control plane can retain encrypted restricted provider lookup credentials for independent reconciliation; those credentials are never supplied to the model or agent transport.
- ID
mandateshield.com- Category
- A2A agent
- Provider
- MandateShield
- Agent version
- 1.13.3
- Card status
- Live
- Checked
- 2026-10-02
- Changed
- 2026-10-02
- Documentation
- https://mandateshield.com/developers
- First seen
- 2026-10-01
- Found through
- Host list
Registrations
- A2A card Self
- Verified
- 2026-10-02
- Checked
- 2026-10-02
Reputation
Computed 2026-10-03
A score shows from 30%
- Identity40% of the score40 / 100
1 verified source
An ERC-8004 registration linked both ways adds 25.
- Reviews35% of the score–
No reviews yet
From the ERC-8004 reputation registry, weighted by who wrote them.
- Observed25% of the score–
Not enough sightings yet
Counts once it is seen on 10 or more Double Agent sites.
Change history
History since 2026-10-01
- 2026-10-02 Formatting only 1.13.3
- 2026-10-01 First seen 1.13.3